China Antitrust Law Journal

Happy New Year of the Ox! Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, antitrust enforcement in China remained robust in 2020. On the merger front, the State Administration for Market Regulation („SAMR”) unconditionally approved more than 99% of the 458 transactions reviewed and imposed conditions in just four transactions. SamR has also released a series of new guidelines in the area of antitrust, providing more guidance on its enforcement priorities and interpretation of the law. On the other hand, in the context of the second private follow-up dispute, the General Court reached the same conclusion as the Authority responsible for the enforcement of cartels against the defendant. In this case, the defendant, Jiacheng Concrete, received an administrative penalty from the Shaanxi Administration for Market Regulation („Shaanxi AMR”) for his monopolistic conduct. Relying on the administrative decision of the Shaanxi RAM against Jiacheng Concrete, the Higher People`s Court of Shaanxi Province ruled in the plaintiff`s favor because there was no evidence to the contrary, although the administrative decision was not reviewed or appealed. [20] Tech companies will continue to be the target of private antitrust litigation in 2020, although none of the plaintiffs have been successful in any of the lawsuits against these tech giants. For example, Huaduo`s complaint against a leading Chinese Internet technology company for abuse of a dominant market position by it with respect to a well-known online game was dismissed in May 2020 before the Guangdong Provincial Supreme People`s Court on the grounds that the defendant did not have a dominant position in the relevant market. Regardless of this, SAMR gave the 24th. In December 2020, it announced that it had opened an investigation into Alibaba, including for abuse of a dominant position in the market.

This means that samr is prepared to extend the implementing measures more widely than on the basis of merger control considerations. On April 10, 2021, SAMR fined RMB 18.2 billion (about $2.8 billion), or about 4 percent of Alibaba`s 2019 revenue in China, for abuse of a dominant position in the market. This is the highest fine ever imposed in the history of antitrust enforcement in China. Prior to December 2020, there were very few known antitrust enforcement actions against an internet company in China. In recent decades, Chinese internet companies have grown exponentially, while at the same time, the consolidation of the sector has taken place. Meanwhile, China has continued to promote and act to create a more open, efficient and competitive market. With respect to merger control filings, SAMR and the law have now made it clear that a number of high-profile antitrust enforcement events have spread to China`s internet sector. In this alert, we provide an overview of these events and our observations on the possible effects on competition in the market. In the first case, the Shanghai Higher People`s Court dismissed Hanyang Guangming`s lawsuit against Hankook Tire.

The court pointed out that while the elements of an administrative act performed by an antitrust authority can be used as evidence in court, courts are not required to admit documents that are not relevant to the dispute in the private dispute. [19] The Applicant submitted that the Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau`s 2016 administrative decision to punish Hankook Tire found that Hankook Tire entered into and implemented resale pricing agreements and that this administrative decision could serve as a basis for proving the facts in the private litigation. The plaintiff also argued that the lower court erred in reaching a finding that contradicted the administrative decision of the Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau. The Shanghai Higher People`s Court disagreed with the plaintiff and upheld the lower court`s finding that Hankook Tire`s actions did not constitute resale pricing agreements within the meaning of the AML. This case shows that courts do not always follow the decisions of an antitrust regulator, making it less predictable and more difficult for claimants to succeed in private follow-up proceedings. As it is difficult to apply traditional approaches to antitrust enforcement to the platform economy, the Platform Guidelines provide specific and tailor-made guidance, including on concentrations of undertakings, monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance. For example, the Platform Guidelines recognise the complexity of the platform economy and recognise that a market would not necessarily be defined by reference to a company`s core services. .

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